Richmond releases preliminary report on widespread water crisis

RICHMOND, Va. (WRIC) -- The City of Richmond has released the preliminary after-action report into the widespread water crisis that sent shockwaves through the region in January.

From Monday, Jan. 6 to Saturday, Jan. 11, water service in Richmond, as well as the counties of Henrico, Hanover and Goochland, was significantly impacted. Some residents had low water pressure -- many had none at all. Even then, any water that could be squeezed from the taps of homes and businesses needed to be boiled before use.

In the wake of this crisis, questions have been raised about how it could have happened -- by everyday people, by businesses and by state agencies.

To better understand how it could prevent such a crisis from happening again, Richmond officials hired a third-party firm to dig deep into what went wrong. That firm, HNTB Corporation, recently provided its preliminary findings to the city, which leadership shared on Thursday, Feb. 13.

This includes a breakdown of the events of Jan. 6, as well as some initial recommendations for the city.

In its press release on the report, Mayor Danny Avula provided the following statement:

The release of the summary findings from HNTB provide an overview of the events of January 6, 2025 at the City’s water treatment plant, including the timing of the power outage that led to flooding that damaged critical plant equipment and computer systems, the staff response, and the service restoration effort. Since water service was restored, the City has made a series of changes to plant operations and equipment. That includes millions of dollars in investments towards the recovery work, much of which has been spent on equipment upgrades and repairs — including new backup power systems. We have also made meaningful changes to plant procedures, consistent with several HNTB recommendations, as part of continuing efforts to make water treatment plant operations more resilient. Mayor Danny Avula

Scott Morris, who was appointed the interim director of the city's Department of Utilities (DPU) after the previous director resigned shortly after the water crisis was resolved, provided the following statement:

Many of the water plant process improvement recommendations in the HNTB report align with steps that have already been taken to more effectively deploy staff, prepare them for emergency response situations, strengthen system redundancy, and enhance preparedness protocols through training and practice exercises. That includes readiness preparation for inclement weather events, as well as regular checks of facility equipment, fuel, chemicals, and systems to avert the potential for future impact on operational continuity and service delivery. Richmond DPU Interim Director Scott Morris

8News got the chance to speak with Avula on Thursday after a media event about which recommendations have been implemented and which haven't. His statement will be added to this article shortly.

An overview: Five big takeaways

HNTB's preliminary after-action report provides a thorough look into the timeline of events on Monday, Jan. 6. Previously, city officials could not provide explicit details on said timeline, meaning this report provides much-needed clarity in several ways.

Five of the most significant revelations are as follows:

1. There were two outages that night, not just one. The first outage, described as a "power bump" by HNTB, took place just under an hour before the second, main outage. As a result of this outage, a finished water pump -- or a pump that handles water ready for public distribution -- failed and was offline for some time.
2. The swap between power sources failed because a component was not connected. The water treatment plant has two power sources so that, in the event of an outage impacting the first power source, the other can take over. This process is meant to be automatic. However, because a "bus tie" -- or a connector between power sources -- was not closed, this switch did not happen.
3. The water treatment plant's main computer system went down immediately. Previously, city officials said that the plant's computer system, "SCADA," went down when the backup batteries at the plant ran out of energy, which happened about 45 minutes after the outage. However, HNTB reports that SCADA went down the moment the power went out. The firm also does not mention the backup batteries at all in this context.
4. The over six feet of flooding was only worsened by multiple infrastructural problems. Within ten minutes of the outage, staff observed over six feet of floodwaters in the lowest parts of the plant, as valves could not automatically close without power. The flooding was worsened due to the fact that there was a suction hose not connected to a Godwin pump and a cover not secured over a finished water pump's valve.
5. State officials allegedly arrived sooner than previously claimed. The Virginia Department of Health (VDH) previously told 8News that it heard about the water crisis at about 2:40 p.m. on Jan. 6, when residents began reporting low water pressure. VDH said its representatives then arrived at the water treatment plant "later that afternoon." HNTB reportedly found that VDH representatives were at the plant by 12:30 p.m. -- about two hours before the department said it heard about the issues.

The full version of HNTB's after-action report should be released no later than April 1.

8News continues to work through the report. This article will be updated periodically with a deeper dive into each of these points, as well as the rest of the report's findings.